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As I write this, it has been shortly over a year sinceAndré van derWalt passed
away at the age of 60 on 5 November 2016 after a two-year struggle with
cancer. Many of us who knew and worked with André are still coming to
terms with his legacy and the enormity of the loss that his passing represents.
I cannot hope to do justice to the full scope of André’s legacy as a scholar, so
will simply highlight facets of his work that I regard as particularly signiﬁcant.
I take comfort in knowing that this tribute is but one small part of shared,
on-going endeavours to reﬂect on and commemorate André’s contribution
to South African law by many of his colleagues and former postgraduate
students.
At the time of his death he was incumbent of the South African Research
Chair in Property Law (which celebrated its 10th anniversary in 2017), and
was Distinguished Professor in the Department of Public Law of the
Stellenbosch University Law Faculty. Over the course of his career, he
published 120 articles in academic journals, 19 books, and 21 contributions
to books. Some of these books and articles were written during his period of
illness, and published posthumously. Under his supervision, 13 master’s and
17 doctoral students completed their postgraduate studies under the auspices
of the Research Chair in Property Law. From 2002 he held an ‘A’ rating
from the National Research Foundation, which is reserved for researchers
who are unequivocally recognised by their peers as leading international
scholars in their ﬁeld for the high quality and impact of their research
outputs. During his career, he has received a large number of national and
international accolades for his scholarship, including being one of the ﬁrst
recipients of the highest award made to staff at Stellenbosch University, the
Chancellor’s Award for research, in 2014.
However, these bare statistics — impressive though they are — cannot
capture the profound transformative impact that André had on property law
in South Africa. André constructed a new theoretical foundation and
interpretative methodology for South African property law in the era of
constitutional democracy. In the process he also made a substantial contribu-
tion to the development of constitutional law.
Paradoxically, André’s most signiﬁcant contribution to property-law
scholarship was to dethrone property rights from their powerful position at
the top of the rights hierarchy. Through a range of articles and books, André
carefully studied and documented how colonial and apartheid property
legislation interacted with, and were reinforced by, common-law property
concepts and doctrines to entrench the exclusion and marginalisation of
black South Africans from land and property. For André, interrogating and
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reimagining the very nature of property rights as a system lay at the heart of
transforming the structural inequalities and socio-economic disparities per-
vading post-apartheid South Africa. He argued that the necessary reforms
would have to go much further, at least in some cases, than the ‘business as
usual’, interstitial dogmatic shifts and adaptions that characterise ‘normal’
developments of the common law. Inevitably the impetus to effect these
fundamental changes to the existing property regime would produce
tensions with vested property rights, and the overall tendency of constitu-
tional orders and legal systems to preserve stability and the status quo.
However, these tensions, according to André, could also be a fertile source
for generating new constitutionally directed property doctrines (see particu-
larly his monograph, A J van derWalt Property in the Margins (2009)).
One of André’s key insights in developing the theoretical foundations of
the new property law is that ﬁxed, clear property rules, even with their
qualiﬁcations and exceptions, have to make way for ‘personal uncertainty
and systemic openness’ (ibid at 21). As a result, property ‘loses its traditional
central character and acquires a marginal character’ (ibid). Occupying these
margins, property law becomes as deeply concerned with those who do not
have property, or whose property rights are weak or insecure, as it is with
those who enjoy ample, strong rights to property. In André’s words (ibid at
241–2):
‘Marginality involves legal positions not characterised or dominated by the
presence of rights, possessions, privilege and power. Thinking and arguing
about property in a way that takes the persons in those positions and their
interests and circumstances seriously means, at the very least, that we have to try
and think away the power and the centrality of rights, entitlements and
privileges and to imagine a legal order not dominated by the hierarchies built
on the distinction between their presence or absence.’
Moving property rights, particularly the dominant rights associated with
ownership, to the margins creates space for the recognition of other rights,
values and interests previously unrecognised (or weakly recognised) in our
legal system, such as personal circumstances and need, housing, human
dignity and substantive equality.A related implication of marginality thinking
in property theory is that the adjudication of property-related disputes should
be ﬁnely attuned to the historical, social and personal context of the parties
and the dispute. In a seminal article published in 2014 he argued that
property rights had an important, but modest systemic role in relation to
other primary values in a democratic society such as human dignity and
equality (A J van der Walt ‘The modest systemic status of property rights’
(2014) 1 Journal of Law, Property and Society 15). Memorably, he concluded
this article with the following description of the role of property rights in a
constitutional democracy (ibid at 106):
‘I prefer to see property as a gaggle of cleaners who move in after everyone else
has left, brandishing buckets and mops, cleaning up the property debris once
the real work of maintaining the democratic legal system has been completed.’
By theorising the shift in property from reigning monarch of the legal
system to cleaner, André has made it possible for property law, despite
(2018) 135 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL196
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
bearing the heavy burden of its colonial and apartheid legacy, to play a useful,
albeit modest, role in the post-apartheid legal system.
The impact of these paradigm-shifting theories on property adjudication
in SouthAfrica is aptly illustrated by the two Constitutional Court judgments
of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) (‘PE
Municipality’) and Daniels v Scribante 2017 (4) SA 341 (CC) (‘Daniels’). In PE
Municipality, the Constitutional Court was called upon to adjudicate an
eviction application against unlawful occupiers in terms of the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
Writing for a unanimous court, Sachs J took care to sketch the historical
context and consequences of land and housing dispossession in South Africa,
not merely as a backdrop, but as integral to the interpretation of the
constitutional and legislative matrix applicable to eviction cases.
This led to the development of a novel approach to adjudicating eviction
disputes. In terms of this approach, courts are enjoined to refrain from
establishing a hierarchical relationship, which privileges in an abstract and
mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed
of a home, or vice versa. Rather their function ‘is to balance out and
reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of
all the interests involved and the speciﬁc factors relevant in each particular
case’ (PE Municipality (supra) para 23). The PE Municipality judgment has led
to a new paradigm for adjudicating eviction disputes, one which emphasises
the search for contextual, participatory solutions to the tensions between
property rights, housing rights and the regulatory powers and duties of organs
of state in eviction disputes.
This new paradigm also requires a different adjudicative method. Courts
are expected to depart from their traditional role as passive umpire and play
an active role in managing the proceedings to produce a just and equitable
result (ibid para 36. For a recent application of this approach by the
Constitutional Court, see Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet NO
2017 (5) SA 346 (CC)). In so doing, they must seek to ‘infuse elements of
grace and compassion into the formal structures of the law’, to ‘balance
competing interests in a principled way’ and to promote ‘the constitutional
vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and shared concern’
(PE Municipality (supra) para 37). The theoretical foundations of this
historically sensitive, contextual and creative adjudicative approach were laid
byAndré’s meticulous scholarship.
In Daniels, the Constitutional Court held that Ms Daniels, a domestic
worker residing on a farm in the Stellenbosch region, was entitled to make
modest improvements to her home at her own expense to render it
habitable, without the consent of the owner of the farm, but subject to
meaningful engagement on the logistical arrangements for the building
work. The majority judgment of Madlanga J is infused with a deep
appreciation of the historical and social context which shaped and continues
to shape the power relationships between farm owners and dwellers in South
Africa. The right of an occupier in terms of s 6 of the Extension of Security of
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TenureAct 62 of 1997 (‘ESTA’) to reside on the land was interpreted through
the prism of the right to human dignity explicitly recognised in s 5 of ESTA.
This allowed for the possibility to read-in a right to make improvements to
the dwelling, even though s 6 did not explicitly provide for such a right. Key
concepts in ESTA such as the right to ‘reside’ and ‘security of tenure’ were
accordingly interpreted to imply a habitable dwelling of a standard that beﬁts
human dignity and its entailments of self-determination and self-expression
(Daniels (supra) paras 23–35).
In his concurring separate judgment, Froneman J pays explicit tribute to
André’s pioneering scholarship, particularly his insight that ‘the absolutisa-
tion of ownership and property and the hierarchy of rights it spawned did not
fulﬁl the purpose of founding political and economic freedom in South
Africa’ (ibid para 136). A post-apartheid constitutional property-law system
will sometimes require changes to the very foundations upon which the
current distribution of property rests (Van der Walt Property in the Margins op
cit at 16). As Froneman J goes on to point out (Daniels (supra) para 137), this
insight cuts deeper than the redress of historical injustices and racial
inequalities. The values of the Constitution speak not only to the past and
present, but also the future: ‘A future ‘‘Ms Daniels’’will still be entitled to live
a digniﬁed life, no matter the race of the owner.’
In developing the new theoretical foundations of property law in South
Africa and working out their practical implications, André also made an
important contribution to constitutional law in SouthAfrica. In particular, he
was concerned to develop an approach to constitutional adjudication that
gave effect to the ‘single system of law’ principle laid down in the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers judgment (Ex Parte President of the Republic of
South Africa: In re Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa 2000
(2) SA 674 (CC) para 44). He demonstrated how the subsidiarity principles
developed by the Constitutional Court could strengthen the single-system-
of-law principle by illuminating the unifying, systemic relationship between
the Constitution, legislation, the common law and customary law (see, for
example, A J van derWalt ‘Normative pluralism and anarchy: Reﬂections on
the 2007 term’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 77; A J van der Walt
Property and Constitution (2012) ch 2).
André argued that applying subsidiarity principles to seemingly overlap-
ping sources of law (constitutional text, legislation, common law and
customary law) had had important beneﬁts. By applying legislation enacted
to give effect to constitutional rights, it afﬁrmed the important role of the
democratically elected legislature in giving shape and substance to broadly
formulated constitutional norms (Van derWalt Property and Constitution op cit
at 100–3). Secondly, it helps guard against the courts’ ignoring or minimising
constitutional provisions (or new laws enacted under them) and deciding
cases in terms of traditional common-law rules or doctrines, with possible
counter-transformative results (ibid at 104–5).
However, André was at pains to emphasise that subsidiarity principles are
not to be conﬂated with avoidance of the Constitution and its normative
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value system. Whatever the relevant source of law, it must be interpreted,
applied, or where necessary, developed to promote and advance the ‘spirit,
purport and objects’ of the Bill of Rights, as required by s 39(2) of the
Constitution. This entails both interpreting legislation through a constitu-
tional prism, and developing the common law and customary law to align
with the direction-giving normative purposes and values of the Constitution.
It does not imply automatic deference to legislative provisions without a
serious and critical engagement of their consistency with the Constitution,
nor does it imply according privileged status to existing common-law
doctrines and rules. As André indicated in relation to legislation (ibid at
100–2):
‘[S]ubsidiarity principles cannot be applied mechanistically so as to exclude
serious consideration of the constitutional principles underlying and directing
any legislation, because doing so could undermine the principle of constitu-
tional supremacy.’
He said a similar thing in relation to the common law (ibid at 96):
‘It may very well sometimes be necessary to solve a particular dispute in terms of
the common law rather on the basis of a constitutional rights provision, but
both the decision to resort to development of the common law and the actual
development of the common law should be animated by the desire to give
effect to a particular constitutional right as well as the broad spectrum of
constitutional principles and values.’
For André subsidiary principles were a way of ensuring a careful,
structured engagement with the Constitution. He preferred to describe
subsidiarity as an ‘angle of approach’ (a phrase he attributed to colleague
Henk Botha) — an ‘analytic rhythm’ rather than a rigid doctrine which
reinvented the hierarchies and formalism to which our legal culture is
predisposed (ibid at 105).
André would often exhort us ‘to leave no stone unturned’ in examining
the implications of purportedly neutral, innocuous background rules and
doctrines for constitutionally directed transformation of our legal system. He
was a rare academic who had a deep and broad knowledge of the common
law, constitutional law as well as comparative law. This placed him in a
unique position not only to detect and demonstrate the need for changes to
legal rules and doctrines, but also — in close collaboration with his talented
group of postgraduate students and associates — to work out the nature of
these changes in diverse areas of property law such as evictions law,
expropriation, neighbour law, servitudes, prescription, and many others.
(For an overview of this work see A J van der Walt ‘Property law in the
constitutional democracy’ (2017) 28 Stellenbosch LR 8.) In so doing, he left us
with the legacy of a new property law ﬁt for the purpose of serving the
foundational values of our constitutional democracy.
Turning to André as a colleague in the Stellenbosch University Law
Faculty, I will highlight three dimensions. First, André was an academic in
the very best sense of the tradition. Despite his brilliance, he knew there was
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no substitute for long, lonely hours of reading and writing. He did not seek
the limelight, nor did he aspire to be a ‘public intellectual’ through media
appearances or related activities. However, because of his meticulous
scholarship, his profound impact on SouthAfrican and international property
law and theory will endure.
Fundamental to his concept of academic citizenship was his commitment
to training and mentoring a new generation of young legal academics and
scholars.At the beginning of each year he ran a brilliant set of generic training
seminars for postgraduate students in the Faculty on issues such as writing a
research proposal; academic reading and writing strategies; referencing
protocols; planning a career and so forth. I for one always made a point to
attend at least one or two of these seminars a year. I never failed to beneﬁt
from André’s passion for research and writing and to come away with new
insights and inspiration for engaging in the process of research, writing and
postgraduate supervision. His postgraduate students will attest to his brilliant
training and mentorship of them as young academics.
Secondly, he was a generous colleague and friend to many in the Faculty
— always interested in our research projects and willing to offer insights and
advice on our careers, and professional dilemmas. These sessions were
frequently conducted over coffee or, preferably, a glass of good red wine.
Finally, André was a passionate and principled advocate for social justice
and transformation. He did not only preach this, but applied this in his
research on constructing a more just property-law system for SouthAfrica, in
the diversity of young master’s and doctoral candidates he selected to work
with him in the South African Research Chair in Property Law, and in the
stand he took for transformation and a more inclusive language policy within
the Stellenbosch Law Faculty and the wider University. This took great
courage, and often placed him at the margins of mainstream opinion,
particularly within the Stellenbosch community. But it was consistent with
André’s respect for the transformative power of the margins in property law.
He did not ever waver from his principles, and thereby gave us an abiding
example of true leadership. It is my ardent hope that André’s values and his
example will be the beacons which guide the Stellenbosch University Law
Faculty in charting its future course without him.
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